## Symmetric Matrix Perturbation For Differentially-Private Principal Component Analysis

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#### Outline


#### 1 Motivation

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- **3** Differential privacy
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


## Why learn from private data?



- Much of private/sensitive data is being digitized
- Using/reusing data learn about populations
- Free and open sharing ethical, legal, and technological obstacles






## **Principal Component Analysis**



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## The PCA problem




Data matrix:  $X = [x_1 \ x_2 \ \dots \ x_n]$ , samples are in columns Second-moment matrix  $A = XX^{\top}$ . We can decompose A as

$$A = V \Lambda V^{\top}$$

where  $\Lambda = \mathsf{diag}(\lambda_1, \lambda_2, \dots, \lambda_n)$  and  $\lambda_1 \ge \lambda_2 \ge \dots \ge \lambda_n$ 



## The PCA problem




The rank-k approximation of A:

$$A_k = V_k \Lambda_k V_k^\top$$

The top-k PCA subspace is the span of the corresponding columns of V.




#### Why we need privacy in PCA?



Changing one sample can significantly change the principal direction






## **Differential Privacy**



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#### Differential privacy: a definition




[Dwork et al. 2006] An algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$  is  $(\varepsilon, \delta)$ -differentially private if for any set of outputs  $\mathcal{F}$ , and all  $(\mathcal{D}, \mathcal{D}')$  differing in a single point,

$$\mathbb{P}\left(\mathcal{A}(\mathcal{D}) \in \mathcal{F}\right) \le \exp(\varepsilon) \cdot \mathbb{P}\left(\mathcal{A}(\mathcal{D}') \in \mathcal{F}\right) + \delta$$



#### Differential privacy: hypothesis testing





Tradeoff between privacy and utility. With more data:

- Stronger evidence for structure  $\rightarrow$  more accuracy/utility
- Less dependence on individuals  $\rightarrow$  less privacy risk
- How much data do we need?
- What is the tradeoff in practice?



#### Differentially-private PCA Algorithms


Several algorithms are available:

- $(\epsilon, \delta)$ : Analyze Gauss [Dwork et al. 2014]
- $(\epsilon, \delta)$ : Private Power Method [Hardt et al. 2014]
- $(\epsilon, 0)$ : PPCA [Chaudhuri et. al. 2013, McSherry et. al. 2007]
- $(\epsilon, 0)$ : Proposed Symmetric Noise (SN) algorithm
- $(\epsilon, \delta)$ : Wishart noise [Sheffet 2015] (linear regression)
- $(\epsilon, 0)$ : Wishart noise [Jiang 2016] (in a parallel effort)

|                     | AG           | PPM          | PPCA         | SN           |
|---------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| Estimates $\hat{A}$ | ✓            | X            | X            | ✓            |
| $\hat{A}$ PSD       | X            | -            | _            | $\checkmark$ |
| $\delta > 0$        | $\checkmark$ | 1            | ×            | X            |
| $\delta = 0$        | X            | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |

Table: Comparison of Algorithms





## **Proposed** SN algorithm



#### Proposed SN Algorithm: Wishart noise addition

**Input:**  $d \times n$  data matrix X, privacy parameter  $\epsilon$ , dimension k.

- **1** Compute  $A = XX^{\top}$ .
- **2** Generate  $d \times p$  matrix  $Z = [z_1, z_2, \dots, z_p]$  where  $z_i \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \frac{1}{2\epsilon}I)$ and p = d + 1.

**Output:**  $\hat{A} = A + ZZ^{\top}$ . Set  $\hat{V}_k$  using PCA on  $\hat{A}$ .

*Remark*: Adding wishart noise preserves the PSD structure of A, which is not the case for AG [Dwork et al. 2014]



## Analysis of SN algorithm



#### Privacy of SN Algorithm

- $z_i$  are iid  $\sim \mathcal{N}(0, \frac{1}{2\epsilon}I_d)$  where  $\{z_i : i = 1, 2, \dots, d+1\}$
- $Z = [z_1, z_2, \ldots, z_p]$
- The positive semidefinite  $E = ZZ^{\top}$  is distributed  $\sim$  Wishart  $W_d(\Sigma, p)$  where  $\Sigma = \frac{1}{2\epsilon}I_d$  and p = d + 1


$$f_E(E) \propto \left(\det(E)\right)^{\frac{p-d-1}{2}} \exp\left(-\frac{1}{2}\operatorname{tr}\left(\Sigma^{-1}E\right)\right)$$
$$\propto \exp\left(-\epsilon \operatorname{tr}(E)\right)$$



#### Privacy of SN Algorithm

- Two neighboring databases with A and A', an output Y from SN.
- Data samples satisfy  $||x_i||_2 \leq 1$  and therefore,  $||A A'||_2 \leq 1$ .

$$\frac{f_E(Y-A)}{f_E(Y-A')} = \frac{\exp\left(-\epsilon \operatorname{tr}(Y-A)\right)}{\exp\left(-\epsilon \operatorname{tr}(Y-A')\right)} \le \exp\left(\epsilon\right).$$





# Empirical performance of SN algorithm



#### What do we mean by performance?

The performance can be different in different applications:


- captured energy of A in the private subspace
- classification performance of projected data on  $\hat{V}_k$
- difference between the A and  $\hat{A}$

Percentage of captured energy w.r.t SVD 
$$=rac{ ext{tr}(\hat{V}_k^ op A\hat{V}_k)}{ ext{tr}(V_k^ op AV_k)} imes 100$$



- Synthetic data set (d = 100, n = 60000, k = 10) was generated with a pre-determined covariance matrix
- The *Covertype* dataset (d = 54, k = 10) contains Forest CoverTypes - was collected by Department of Forest Sciences of Colorado State University. Has 5,81,012 samples.
- The MNIST (d = 784, k = 50) database of handwritten digits. Has 60,000 training and 10,000 testing samples






- AG, PPM and SN standard deviation of noise is inversely proportional to  $\epsilon$
- Smaller  $\epsilon$  means more noise and lower privacy risk.
- For PPCA, an increase in  $\epsilon$  means skewing the probability density function more towards the optimal subspace.



#### Dependence on number of samples n



• Intuitively, it should be easier to guarantee smaller privacy risk  $\epsilon$  and higher utility  $q(\cdot)$  when the number of samples is large.



#### Classification

• We projected the d-dimensional data samples onto the private k-dimensional subspace  $\hat{V}_k.$ 

|      | Synthetic |       | COVTYPE |      | MNIST |      |
|------|-----------|-------|---------|------|-------|------|
|      | 70%       | 50%   | 70%     | 50%  | 70%   | 50%  |
| SVD  | 6.63      | 6.34  | 0.08    | 0.08 | 0.61  | 0.32 |
| AG   | 6.58      | 6.32  | 1.08    | 0.85 | 2.72  | 2.38 |
| PPM  | 10.48     | 10.06 | 2.05    | 1.26 | 2.67  | 2.48 |
| PPCA | 7.43      | 7.21  | 5.21    | 4.85 | 3.16  | 2.91 |
| SN   | 7.99      | 7.48  | 0.05    | 0.05 | 2.22  | 2.09 |

#### Table: Percentage error in classification



## Some concluding remarks



#### Conclusions

- The AG and the SN best performance among  $(\epsilon,\delta)$  and  $(\epsilon,0)\text{-private methods, respectively.}$
- In some regimes SN achieved as much utility as AG, even though SN provides stricter privacy guarantee.
- When there's a large eigengap SN provided a very good approx. to  $V_k({\cal A})$
- Also, SN provided a very good approx. to  $A_k$
- We found, [Sheffet 2015] and [Jiang 2016] outperform PPM and PPCA, but did not have empirical utility better than that of SN.
- Results suggest: the asymptotic guarantees for differentially-private algorithms may not always reflect their empirical performance



#### Future Works

- Application in distributed PCA and thus, fMRI analysis
- Can we add less noise?
- When data dimension is large, can we compute  $V_k({\boldsymbol A})$  in any other way?



# Thank you!

