A New Backdoor Attack in CNNs by Training Set Corruption Without Label Poisoning

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Outline

- Motivation
- What is a Backdoor attack and why?
- Backdoor attack requirements
- How our Backdoor attack works?
- Experimental Setup
- Experimental results

Motivation

• Backdoor attacks are serious threats to deep learning



Motivation

- Can be done in two ways: manipulating the network parameters or poisoning the training set
- Backdoor attacks can cause generic or targeted misclassification
- In this work we focus on poisoning the training set



How Backdoor attacks has been done so far?

- Most attacks consider the model fully or partially known to the attacker
- The focus was generic misclassification and it becomes targeted misclassification
- Attacks apply label poisoning: assign the attacked samples a specific label



Backdoor attack requirements

- **REQ1:** Must not impair training: the model should continue to work normally in the absence of the backdoor
- **REQ2:** Should induce error at testing time: when a backdoor sample is injected, the model should start making mistakes
- **REQ3:** The backdoor should be as stealthy as possible even when the trainer investigate the training set

✓ Label poisoning put its stealthiness at risk → it can be discovered if checked because they're assigned different labels

Label poisoning

• Classify a cat as a dog: training





Label poisoning

• Classify a cat as a dog: testing





Label poisoning

• Classify a cat as a dog: training



• If you have yet another class, you need different backdoor

No Label poisoning

• Classify a cat as a dog: training







No Label poisoning

• Classify a cat as a dog: testing



Desired behavior on inputs with backdoor triggering signals: ALL DOGS



No Label poisoning

• Classify a cat as a dog: training



• If you have another class, you DON'T need different backdoor



Contribution

- We consider a fully black-box attack: the attacker doesn't know the model
- We consider target classification: the attacker knows toward which class the error is going
- We consider NO label poisoning : we shouldn't change the labels of the attacked samples → slealthy



How our Backdoor attack works?



How our Backdoor attack works?

• Testing





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K. Kallas

• Ramp signal: $v(i,j) = \frac{j\Delta}{m}$, for $1 \le j \le m, 1 \le i \le l$ where, $m = nb. of \ columns, l = nb. of \ rows$



$$\Delta = 20 \times 4 \qquad \Delta = 40 \times 4 \qquad \Delta = 60 \times 4$$

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• Triangle signal:
$$\begin{cases} v(i,j) = \frac{(m-j)\Delta}{m}, \text{ for } 1 \le j \le \frac{m}{2}, 1 \le i \le l\\ v(i,j) = \frac{j\Delta}{m}, \text{ for } \frac{m}{2} < j \le m, 1 \le i \le l \end{cases}$$



• Horizontal sinusoidal signal: $v(i,j) = \Delta \sin\left(\frac{2\pi jf}{m}\right)$, f is the frequency



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Δ=40, f=6 x4

• Ramp signal



Sinusoidal signal



Backdoor with Δ =40



Backdoor with Δ =20, f=6





Experimental Setup

- Datasets:
 - ✓ MNIST:
 - 10 digits (classes): 0-9
 - Grayscale 28x28
 - *~ 6000 samples/class for training & ~ 1000 samples/class for testing
 - ✓ GTSRB:
 - Select the most populated 16 classes
 - ✤RGB 32x32
 - *~ 1000 samples/class for training & ~ 450 samples/class for testing

Experimental Setup

• Networks:

 ✓ For MNIST: a KERAS VGG-like model with 5 convolutional layers, 2 FC and 1 Softmax
✓ For GTSRB: LeNet-5

✓ ResNet-50





• REQ1: We didn't impair the training



• REQ2: We induce error at testing time



$$\alpha = 0.3, t = 3, \Delta_{tr} = 30, \Delta_{ts} = 40$$



Attack success rate (%) in the case of MNIST classification for several values of α and $\Delta_{ts}(\Delta_{tr}=30)$, for different target digits t. The rate is averaged over all the test digits.

| | <i>t</i> = 2 | | | | t = 4 | | | | t = 7 | | | | <i>t</i> = 9 | | | |
|--------------------------|--------------|----|----|----|-------|----|----|----|-------|----|----|----|--------------|----|----|----|
| α / Δ_{ts} | 30 | 40 | 60 | 80 | 30 | 40 | 60 | 80 | 30 | 40 | 60 | 80 | 30 | 40 | 60 | 80 |
| 0.2 | 77 | 83 | 91 | 93 | 23 | 27 | 34 | 44 | 28 | 35 | 45 | 55 | 67 | 75 | 86 | 89 |
| 0.3 | 71 | 79 | 88 | 92 | 67 | 75 | 86 | 90 | 49 | 61 | 77 | 87 | 73 | 79 | 88 | 92 |
| 0.4 | 85 | 91 | 96 | 97 | 69 | 77 | 88 | 92 | 70 | 77 | 86 | 90 | 91 | 95 | 99 | 99 |

- Higher α is better
- Higher Δ_{ts} is better
- Then, why α != 1.0?



| | | | | Confus | sion Matr | ix (adver | sarial) | | | |
|-----|------|------|------|--------|-----------|-----------|---------|------|------|------|
| | 0 | | 2 | | 4 | | 6 | | 8 | |
| 0 - | 0.38 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.53 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.07 |
| | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 2 · | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.26 | 0.74 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 4 · | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.90 | 0.10 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.00 |
| | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.93 | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 6 · | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.96 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 8 - | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.48 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.52 | 0.00 |
| | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.99 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |



RESNET With alpha = 0.3, Delta_tr = 40, t = 3

VGG-Like With alpha = 0.3, Delta_tr = 40, t = 3

LetNet5 With alpha = 0.3, Delta_tr = 40, t = 3

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Experimental Results (GTSRB)



pristine

Experimental Results (GTSRB)

• It works BUT less effectively than MNIST



 $\alpha = 0.2, t = 1, \Delta_{tr} = 20, f = 6, \Delta_{ts} = 30$

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Experimental Results (GTSRB)

Attack success rate (%) in the case of traffic sign classification for different $\Delta_{ts}(\Delta_{tr}=20, \alpha=0.2, f=6)$. The rate is averaged on the 7 most successfully attacked test signs.

| %/ Δ _{ts} | t = 1 | | | | <i>t</i> = 3 | | | | t = 7 | | | | <i>t</i> = 13 | | | |
|--------------------|-------|----|----|----|--------------|----|----|----|-------|----|----|----|---------------|----|----|----|
| | 20 | 30 | 40 | 60 | 20 | 30 | 40 | 60 | 20 | 30 | 40 | 60 | 20 | 30 | 40 | 60 |
| % | 73 | 81 | 79 | 83 | 39 | 62 | 76 | 87 | 52 | 71 | 83 | 93 | 26 | 48 | 60 | 78 |

• Attack success rate increases with Δ_{ts}





Experimental Results: Multi-target attack



• At test time, we can inject b_1 , b_2 or both

Experimental Results: Multi-target attack



- Train by poisoning t = 5 with a ramp and t = 9 with a triangle, $\alpha = 0.4$, and $\Delta_{tr} = \Delta_{ts} = 30$
- Multiple-target attacks are also possible

Conclusions and Future work

- We develop a new backdoor attack without label poisoning
- Price to pay with respect to attacks with label poisoning is the percentage of samples to be attacked
- Experiments on MNIST and GTSRB were successful
- Better development of Backdoor signals
- Investigate more the fact that backdoor could be dataset dependent

Thank you!



