

On Adversarial Robustness of Large-scale Audio Visual Learning

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




Language Technologies Institute



Audio/Visual Event Recognition in Safety Critical Tasks





Al smart speakers



2



Echo



Dataset: AudioSet, Kinects Sounds























Weak label 2Million 10s **527 Classes** Audio+Video


















Tasks of audio visual event recognition To predict the tag of an audio visual event, such as "Applause" or

"Clapping"




LogMel spectrogram of selected audio recordings from AudioSet






Background: Adversarial Examples












0.2

0.3

0.1

0



+ 0.005 x

600

Time

Adversarial Music Li et al. [2019]

1000


800








Background: Point-wise Robustness, Adversarial Training







ImageNet L2-robust accuracy					
	ε-train				
ε-test	0.0	3.0			
0.0	76.13% / -	57.90% / -			
0.5	3.35% / 2.98%	54.42% / 54.42%			
1.0	0.44% / 0.37%	50.67% / 50.67%			
2.0	0.16% / 0.14%	43.04% / 43.02%			
3.0	0.13% / 0.12%	35.16% / 35.09%			

Centered Chebyshev Ball

Jordan et al. [2019]

Adversarial Training Ilyas, Madry et al. [2021]

Main Questions and Answers

Answer: Not Necessarily. see Theorem 1.


Q2) How to efficiently measure the robustness of multi-modal learning? Answer: Previous works only focused on point-wise robustness, we should also look into class-wise robustness. ICASSP 2022 **Q3)** How to fuse different modalities to achieve a more robust multi-modal

model?

Answer: We propose multimodal mixup as a cheap alternative to adversarial














Multimodal Adversarial Perturbation

Multimodal Loss:

Our Goal:

 $\underset{\delta_A \in C(x_A), \delta_V \in C(x_V)}{\text{Maximize}} [\mathbf{E}_{x_A, y \sim \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{A}}; x_V, y \sim \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{V}}}, [L(f(x'), y)]]$

subject to $C(x) = \{x \in \mathbb{R}^d : ||x||_p \le \epsilon\}.$

Audio Perturbation:

$$\delta_A = \mathcal{P}_{\epsilon} \left(\delta_A - \alpha \frac{\nabla_{\delta_A} L(f(g(x_A + \delta_A) \oplus h(x_V)))}{\|\nabla_{\delta_A} L(f(g(x_A + \delta_A) \oplus h(x_V)))\|} \right)$$

Multimodal Perturbation: $\delta_A, \delta_V := \mathcal{P}_\epsilon(\delta_{(V,A)} - lpha)$





- $L_{multi} = L(f(g(x_{m_1}) \oplus h(x_{m_2}) \oplus \cdots \oplus z(x_{m_k})), y),$

 $\delta_V =$ $\frac{(y)(y)}{(y)(y)} \quad \text{Video Perturbation:} \quad \mathcal{P}_{\epsilon} \left(\delta_{V} - \alpha \frac{\nabla_{\delta_{V}} L(f(h(x_{V} + \delta_{V}) \oplus g(x_{A})), y)}{\|\nabla_{\delta_{V}} L(f(h(x_{V} + \delta_{V}) \oplus g(x_{A})), y)\|_{r}} \right)$

$$rac{
abla_{\delta_{(V,A)}}L(f(h(x_V+\delta_V)\oplus g(x_A+\delta_A)),y)}{\|
abla_{\delta_{(V,A)}}L(f(h(x_V+\delta_V)\oplus g(x_A+\delta_A)),y)\|_p})$$




Our Approach

Theorem 1 There exists a sample $x_i \in D$, and a unimodal samplewise attack $\exists ||\delta_{A,i}||_p \leq \epsilon_A$ or $\exists ||\delta_{V,i}||_p \leq \epsilon_V$ that can break a multimodal fusion network $f((x_{V,i} \oplus x_{A,i}), y_i)$, changing its prediction label y_i .

Here, *D* is the dataset, and ε_A and ε_V are the point-wise robustness threshold for each uni-modal of sample x_i . Therefore, as a conjecture, a unimodal attack can break a multimodal model, which we empirically verified the existence of such cases in our experiments.

The proof of Theorem 1 can be found in the appendix page.



Convolutional Self-Attention Network (CSN)

Audio Encoding Network

- 10 Stacked Convolutions and Pooling Layers. 5 pooling layers are insert after every 2 convolution layers.
- The outputs of the convolution encoder are fed into 2 transformer blocks to further model the global interaction among frames.

Video Encoding Network (3D-CNN)

• R(2+1)D block which decomposes the 3D (spatial-temporal) CNN into a spatial 2D convolution followed by a temporal 1D convolution.





Fig1. The overall architecture of the network studied (left) audio branch (right) video branch





Main Questions and Answers

Answer: Not Necessarily, see Theorem 1.

also look into class-wise robustness.

Q3) How to fuse different modalities to achieve a more robust multi-modal model?

Answer: We propose multimodal mixup as a cheap alternative to adversarial

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S I N G A P O R E





Q2) How to efficiently measure the robustness of multi-modal learning? Answer: Previous works only focused on point-wise robustness, we should







Class-wise Robustness Metric


Centroid-based Density Metric :

$$\rho_c^{R_\tau, p, c} = \frac{n_c}{\log(V_d^p(R_{p,c}))}$$

In the equation, the numerator is the number of class samples whose I_{o} distance to centroid larger than τ quantile of samples in class c;

 $R_{\tau,p,c}$ is the τ quantile of all class sample's I_p distance to the class's centroid. Intuitively, the density in the outer crust of a ball as is shown in Fig. 1(b) above.


Generally, the higher the density of the crust, the more robust the samples within/below the crust are.





Class-wise Robustness Metric

Convexity-based Metric :



For each class C in the dataset, we construct the convex set of $S = \{ x_{s} | x_{s} = \theta x_{1} + (1 - \theta) x_{2}, \theta \sim U[0, 1], \forall x_{1}, x_{2} \in C \},\$ and sample n points from it $\{x_1, ..., x_n | x_i \in S\}$, we set n =2000, where y_c is the class label.

The higher the κ_c is, the more convex the decision boundary of class C is.










Q3) How to fuse different modalities to achieve a more robust multi-modal model?

Answer: We propose multimodal mixup as a cheap alternative to adversarial training. We desire to augment the less convex classes of training data with more samples from the "denser" samples which are closer to the center of its feature space.


We tune mixup temperature between audio and video samples according to empirical threshold of the above-mentioned Density metric ρ and the Convexity metric κ_{c}












Performance Drop rate vs. Kc

Trendline



Audio Class Label

• Selected Audio Class Label $[\rho^{60}, \rho^{80}]$

• Siren Class

different colors for better visualization





Results:

Table 1. Performance of our best performing model on AudioSet, and their performance against the adversarial perturbation, using the overall architecture shown in Fig 2.

Here, mAP is the mean average precision, AUC is the area under the false positive rate and true positive rate.

The d-prime can be calculated from AUC [1].

AT denotes adversarial training. A red text color indicates the most **potent** perturbation against the model.

Models

Audio UniMo Audio UniMo Mid Fusion (Mid Fusion Mid Fusion Mid Fusion Mid Fusion m Mid Fusion m Mid Fusion A Mid Fusion A



	Attack	mAP	AUC	d-prime
odal (PANNS) [23]	No	0.383	0.963	2.521
odal	Yes	0.183	0.895	1.770
(G-blend) [14]	No	0.427	0.971	2.686
	Yes A+V	0.182	0.889	1.836
	Yes V-only	0.339	0.954	2.441
	Yes A-only	0.310	0.940	2.276
nixup	No	0.424	0.972	2.711
nixup	Yes A+V	0.234	0.891	1.983
AT	No	0.397	0.964	2.530
AT	Yes A+V	0.199	0.900	1.861



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Conclusion

- 1. Multimodal Networks are not always more robust than their unimodal counterparts.
- 2. Our density and convexity metric could effectively measure robustness of models in large-scale.
- 3. We propose multimodal mixup as an alternative to adversarial training.

Thank you!



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