

End-to-end speaker spoofing detection



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Outline


- Intro
 - Speaker verification
 - Speaker spoofing attacks
- Spoofing
 - Countermeasures
 - Corpus
 - Motivation
- Deep Learning
 - CLDNN
 - Results




Intro

Speaker verification

- Purpose: Secure assets over voice “voice fingerprint”
- Structure:
 - Train [Background Model]
 - Enrol [Few utterances]
 - Eval [Utterance → Score → Decision]
- Metric:
 - False Acceptance Rate (FAR)
 - False Rejection Rate (FRR)
 - Equal Error Rate (EER),
Half Total Error Rate (HTER)




Spoof detection - Attacks




Impersonation



Replay




Voice conversion (VC)



Text-to-speech (TTS)



Spoofing detection - Example system



Corpus: BTAS 2016

- Impersonation
- Focus: Replay Attacks (VC, TTS also)
- Different “Quality” Attacks (Microphone, Speaker)
- Evaluation has unseen replay (Focus)
- HTER as measure

Type	Train	Dev	Eval
Genuine	4973	4995	5576
Attacks	38580	38580	44920
TTS	2.5%	2.5%	2.5%
VC	90%	90%	87%
Replay (K)	7.5%	7.5%	7%
Replay (U)	-	-	3.5%



BTAS2016 - Evaluation

- Uses HTER, computed from the development set threshold:

$$\theta_{dev} = \arg \min_{\theta} \frac{\text{FAR}_{dev}(\theta) + \text{FRR}_{dev}(\theta)}{2}$$

$$\text{HTER}_{eval} = \frac{\text{FAR}_{eval}(\theta_{dev}) + \text{FRR}_{eval}(\theta_{dev})}{2}$$




Countermeasures

- Standard: Feature + Classifier
- Cepstral features
 - Mel cepstrum
 - Perceptual Linear Predictive
 - Constant Q
 - Gammatone Frequency
- Gaussian mixture model
- Identity Vector (I-Vector)
- **Deep feature approach**



Countermeasures - Deep features

- Extension of classic feature + classifier
- Input: Feature
Output: Class Label
Purpose: Extract spoofing vector (s-vector)
- Final classifier: GMM, LDA, SVM



Corpus: Countermeasures and Baseline of BTAS2016

- Spoof-aware features
- Features > Classifiers
- Aim: Outperform 1st

Position	Feature	Classifier	HTER (%)
3rd	PLP-39	BLSTM-DNN	2.20
2nd	MCEP	LDA	2.04
1st	MFCC+i-MFCC	GMM	1.26



Motivation and Model proposal

Motivation

- Features > Classifier
- Two “independent” tasks: feature + classifier
- Non-task optimized feature (trial + error)
- Classifier parameter (trial + error)

Why not both?



Convolutional Long Short Term Neural Networks (CLDNN)


- Proposed by Google [Learning the Speech Front-end With Raw Waveform CLDNNs]
- Front-end feature extractor (CNN)
- Sequence-classification (LSTM)
- Improved Accuracy (DNN)

All in one model



Model - Time frequency CNN


Time Pooling



Similar to fast fourier transform

Extracts feature

Frequency Conv




Enhances invariance

Operations only over one dimension




Model - LSTM

- Each input \rightarrow Output
- We only have one label / each utterance
- **Many-to-one** mapping
- Last timestep is used as representation



Model - Classifier

- Standard neural network (512 hidden neurons)
- Maps LSTM prediction to error
- Enhanced by a 50% dropout layer



Model description - Overview

 $S = 25$

$F = 560$


$C = 1$

$P'_T = 39$

$P'_f = 128$

2 \square 128 LSTM

1 \square 512 DNN



Experiments

Experiment - Feature details

- Samplerate 16kHz, Converted 32bit data (replay) → 16 bit (others)
- Input is 35ms window frame (560)
- Window shift by 12.5ms (200)
- Sequence length of 25
- 50% Dropout in Classifier
- Adadelta optimization (no learning rate)
- 3 Iterations
- 5 Output neurons (Genuine + 4 Spoof) [merged HQ+LQ]



Results

Attack	MFCC+i-MFCC+GMM	CLDNN
All	1.26%	0.82%
TSS	0.68%	0.51%
VC	0.75%	0.41%
Replay (Known)	1.01%	0.77%
Replay (Unknown)	14.78%	11.24%

All results in HTER%



Summary

- Neural network + raw wave does work (First)
- End to end processing simplifies pipeline
- Capable of generalization (unseen attacks)
- Can also be used as feature extractor (future experiments)



Thanks!

Questions?

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