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Checking Up the Health of Multimedia Security

Agenda

Content Protection Ecosystem

Review of the Anti-piracy Arsenal

Signal Processing in the Presence of an Adversary

Research Outlook

Questions and Answers



The Challenging Transition to Digital

Key specificities of digital content

- Clones rather than copies i.e. no more generational degradation
- Assets can be tangible or intangible
- Ease of dissemination i.e. the world is at your doorstep


Apparition of a bestiary of pirates (Courtesy: Irdeto)



On the cost of piracy...

CNBC's Crime Inc #10: Hollywood Robbery (August 2012)


Threat Analysis



In-Theater Camcording over the Years


Number of pirate samples over time

Source: Raw data from MPAA piracy report (January 2012)



Time-to-Black-Market

Number of days elapsed between US theatrical release and piracy detection
Source: Raw data from MPAA piracy report (January 2012)



Anti-Piracy Arsenal

Regulate

- WIPO 1996 (DMCA, EUCD, Hadopi, etc.)
- SOPA/PIPA

Inform / Educate

- FA©T anti-piracy information campaigns
- Hard-to-counterfeit security features
 - Intaglio, color-shifting inks, holograms, CDIs

Prevent

- Content encryption aka. CAS and DRM
- Anti rip

Interfere / Jam

- Anti-recording e.g. Macrovision
- Anti-camcording

Monitor / Scout


- Data loss prevention systems
- Content fingerprinting

Trace

- Digital watermarking
- Passive forensics



The Forensics Landscape



Multimedia Encryption

Bulk encryption of the content essence

- Symmetric/asymmetric encryption
- Key distribution schemes for broadcast
- Usage rights transported jointly/separately



Selective encryption

- Preserve the battery of low-powered devices
- Provide preview to trigger purchase



Content Fingerprinting

Robust DNA-like compact representation

- Two contents should ‘hash’ to the same fingerprint as long as they are perceptually similar


Baseline framework

- Robust representation: filter banks, transforms, features extraction
- Quantization: ad-hoc, K-means, etc
- Binarization

Properties: granularity, robustness, discriminability, scalability

Applications

- Content identification: automated rights clearance, data loss prevention, broadcast monitoring
- Content realignment



Digital Watermarking



Digital watermarking is a technique which **imperceptibly** alter digital content to hide a **secret message** in a **robust** manner. It is in some sense similar to invisible ink and paper watermarks.

Baseline framework

- Content adaptation: transform, perceptual model
- Communications layer: watermark modulation, resynchronization

Properties: capacity, fidelity, robustness, complexity, security

Applications

- Content protection: traitor tracing, copy control, broadcast monitoring
- Content enrichment a.k.a. second screen

Passive Forensics



Isolation of tell-tale statistical discrepancies

- Sensor forensics
- Processing pipeline forensics

Applications

- Content authentication
 - Reality check after Photoshopping
- Piracy path characterization
 - Compensation of piracy artifacts
 - Adjustment of the tracing piracy
 - Metadata for cross-referencing

Adversary-aware Signal Processing

Potential for money and/or strict laws \Rightarrow opponents and attacks

- Reverse multimedia scrambling techniques
- Wash out digital watermarks
- Reconstruct content from fingerprint
- Clean-up forensic statistical digital traces
- Etc

Objective of the adversary: learn or infer hidden parameters of the system to modify its expected behavior

- Leverage on a priori knowledge about content/secret statistics
- Sensitivity analysis to learn decision boundaries \Rightarrow switch decisions

Strong links to game theory

- Trade-off robustness \leftrightarrow security

Oracle Attack

Step over the secret boundary of a binary decision




- Watermarked or not, authentic or not, key point or not



Secret Estimation from Multiple Observations

Setup: access to several contents watermarked with the same key

⇒ Look for peculiar persistent statistical properties



Exploit this knowledge to attack the system


Reconstruction from SIFT



Original image



Reconstruction from SIFT description



+ inpainting

P. Weinzaepfel, Hervé Jégou, and Patrick Pérez, “*Reconstructing an Image from its Local Descriptors*”, CVPR 2011


Defense Mechanisms

Obfuscation techniques


- Security by obscurity
- Key-dependent parameterization of the system
 - Random permutations, projections, quantization

Cryptographic techniques

- Homomorphic encryption
- Zero-knowledge protocols
- Etc.



Obfuscation Techniques



1. Random tiling of the image
2. Compute some statistics for each tile
e.g. mean, variance, etc
3. Randomized rounding


R. Venkatesan, S.-M. Koon, M. H. Jakubowski, and P. Moulin, “*Robust Image Hashing*”, ICIP 2000



1. Generate low-pass pseudo-random patterns
2. Project the content onto those patterns
3. Take the sign of the correlation value
4. Generate the binary digest with a heuristic design

J. Fridrich and M. Goljan, “*Robust Hash Functions for Digital Watermarking*”, ICIT 2000

CBIR: Randomizing the Quantizer



Baseline idea: randomize the quantizer & use different quantizer for Server and User

Randomized quantizers

- Random training subset
- Random initialization vector
- Stop before convergence

Curious but honest Server

- ~~Reconstruct \mathbf{x}_i from $h(\mathbf{x}_i)$~~
- ~~Reconstruct \mathbf{q} from $h(\mathbf{q})$~~
- Cluster the database vectors
- *Detect similar queries*

B. Mathon, T. Furon, L. Amsaleg, and J. Bringer, “Secure and Efficient Approximate Nearest Neighbors Search”, ACM IHMMSec 2013

The Issue of Security Assessment

How much security is provided by heuristic obfuscation techniques?

■ Different keys \Rightarrow different obfuscated objects?

Several metrics based on information theory

☺ Mutual information, differential entropy, etc

☹ No security proof

What does it mean to be “more secure”?



Conventional Cryptography



Baseline principle: layered architecture to separate the signal processing layer from the cryptographic layer

Cryptographic hash functions
(typically used for authentication)

- High sensitivity: $a \approx b \Rightarrow h(a) \neq h(b)$
- Non invertibility
- Small collision probability

Visual hash: content fingerprint + hash function

- Inherits robustness from the fingerprint and security from the hash
- Does not really work in practice
 - Content fingerprinting is not strictly robust (even with ECC decoder hack)

Homomorphic Encryption



$$E_K(A + B) = E_K(A) \times E_K(B)$$

Linear operations directly in the encrypted domain

- Signal processing in the encrypted domain
- Privacy enhancement technologies

- ☺ Provides all the security features that you could dream of
- ☺ Recent leap forward with Gentry's fully homomorphic scheme
- ☹ Many operations not supported e.g. thresholding, trigonometry, ...
- ☹ Overhead: big and slow!

R.L. Legendijk, Z. Erkin, and M. Barni, “*Encrypted Signal Processing for Privacy Protection*”, IEEE SPM, 2013

Traitor Tracing Codes

Rationale: embed an identifier unique to each recipient to pinpoint the source of a leak

Threat: several users colluding to produce a pirate copy

Risk: framing innocent users

Marking assumption: colluders can only modify bits that differ in their copies

Traitor tracing codes

- Cryptographers: provably secure, decoding, long
- Statisticians: error possible, exhaustive search



Research Outlook

Bad news: most low-hanging fruits have already been picked up

Multimedia encryption

- Format-preserving encryption for collaborative creation
- Impact on the content creation workflow

Digital watermarking

- Dealing with correlated samples
- Dealing with content-dependent transforms
- Perceptual models for stereo, HDR, UWG, HOA, ...
- Real multi-dimensional watermark modulation
- Explaining the discrepancy between theory and practice
- Registration mechanisms

Content fingerprinting

- Registration-gearred fingerprints
- Near-duplicates management

Passive forensics

- Piracy path modeling
- Piracy path identification
- Piracy path characterization



Concluding Remarks

Common pitfalls

- False sense of security by invoking crypto argument
- Inclination to fall in a cats and mouse loop
- Find a solution to a non-existing problem
- Overlooking the impact of security on performances
- Search for perfect security

Challenging marketing strategy

- Return on investment vs. non loss
- History of overselling multimedia security

Small research community at the intersection of multiple disciplines

Questions

