

# **Covert Communications in a Dynamic Interference Environment**

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# Introduction

Much of security research is devoted to keeping the adversary from *intercepting* the message. Here, we consider <u>covert signaling</u>, which keeps the adversary (Willie) from even *detecting* the signal's existence.





# **Covertness Criterion** [1]

Detector ROC



#### Results

Theorem 1 (converse): The throughput is no more than O(n/sqrt(f(n))). *Proof:* Tedious Chebyshev bounding of the performance of a (sub-optimal) power detector at Willie.

Theorem 2 (achievability): The (optimal) throughput is at least O(n log f(n) / f(n)).

Comment:

- + Tight for small f(n).
- + Very loose at f(n) = n.

Note the gap between the achievability and converse.

<u>Theorem 3 (achievability, Willie can only employ a power det)</u>: When Willie employs a power detector, a throughput of O(n / sqrt(f(n))) can be achieved.

#### **Prior Work**

Without a jammer (AWGN) [1]: Alice can send O(sqrt(n)) bits (and no more) in n channel uses reliably and covertly.
With M-block dynamic fading or a time-varying jammer [4,5]: Alice can send O(n) bits in n channel uses reliably and covertly.

Why? Willie is confused about the background environment and thus cannot detect Alice.

So, a dynamic background helps Alice to avoid detection by Willie, but:

Too Slow [6]: Willie is able to estimate the background reliably, and thus keep Alice to O(sqrt(n)) bits.
 Too Fast [1, below]: Willie is able to "average out" the fading, and thus keep Alice to O(sqrt(n)) bits.

# Conclusion

**Dynamics:** A dynamic background can help Alice hide her signal from the Warden Willie, but the rate of variation matters – neither too fast nor too slow is effective.

<u>**Results:</u>** We have derived lower and upper bounds on the throughput of covert communications as a function of the rate of background variation.</u>

# References

[1] B. Bash, D. Goeckel, and D. Towsley, "Limits of reliable communication with low probability of detection on AWGN channels," *IEEE JSAC*, Vol. 31: pp. 1921–1930, Sept. 2013.

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### **Block Fading Model**

f(n): number of fading blocks per codeword of length n

B(n) = n/f(n)

Block 1	Block 2	Block 3	Block 4	•••	Block <i>f(n)</i>
γ n: codeword length					

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