

# DETECTABILITY OF DENIAL-OF-SERVICE ATTACKS ON COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS


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
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# Turing Machine






Mathematical model of an abstract machine that manipulates symbols on a strip of tape according to certain given rules

- Turing machines can simulate any given algorithm and therewith provide a simple but very powerful model of computation
- No limitations on computational complexity, unlimited computing capacity and storage, and execute programs completely error-free
- ⇒ Fundamental performance limits for today's digital computers
- A. M. Turing, "On computable numbers, with an application to the Entscheidungsproblem," *Proc. London Math. Soc.*, vol. 2, no. 42, pp. 230–265, 1936

# **Communication System**



- Let X, Y, and S be finite input, output, state (jamming) alphabets
- ullet For fixed  $oldsymbol{s}^n \in \mathbb{S}^n$ , the DMC is  $W^n(y^n|x^n,oldsymbol{s}^n) = \prod_{i=1}^n W(y_1|x_i,oldsymbol{s}_i)$

**Definition:** The arbitrarily varying channel (AVC)  $\mathfrak W$  is given by

$$\mathfrak{W} = \{W(\cdot|\cdot,s)\}_{s\in\mathbb{S}}.$$

$$F(\mathfrak{W}) = \min_{U \in \mathcal{CH}(\mathfrak{X}; \mathbb{S})} \max_{x \neq \hat{x}} \sum_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} \left| \sum_{s \in \mathbb{S}} W(y | \hat{x}, s) U(s | x) - \sum_{s \in \mathbb{S}} W(y | x, s) U(s | \hat{x}) \right|$$

 $\Rightarrow \mathfrak{W}$  is *symmetrizable* if and only if  $F(\mathfrak{W}) = 0$ 

**Theorem:** The capacity  $C(\mathfrak{W})$  of an AVC  $\mathfrak{W}$  is

$$C(\mathfrak{W}) = \begin{cases} \min_{q \in \mathcal{P}(\mathbb{S})} C(W_q) & \text{if } F(\mathfrak{W}) > 0 \\ \mathbf{0} & \text{if } F(\mathfrak{W}) = \mathbf{0} \end{cases}$$

with  $W_q(y|x) = \sum_{s \in S} W(y|x,s)q(s)$ .

- R. Ahlswede, "Elimination of correlation in random codes for arbitrarily varying channels," *Z. Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie verw. Gebiete*, vol. 44, no. 2, pp. 159–175, Jun. 1978
- I. Csiszár and P. Narayan, "The capacity of the arbitrarily varying channel revisited: Positivity, constraints," *IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory*, vol. 34, no. 2, pp. 181–193, Mar. 1988

#### **Detection Framework**

• Task of a Turing machine  $\mathfrak T$  is to detect denial-of-service attacks

This is an Entscheidungsproblem, since for a given  $\mathfrak{W}$ , the Turing machine  $\mathfrak{T}$  should answer the question whether or not a denial-of-service attack takes place

- A hypothetical algorithm (or Turing machine) takes all channels  $\mathcal{CH}_c(\mathfrak{X}, \mathcal{S}; \mathfrak{Y})$  and partitions this set into two disjoint subsets
- $\mathcal{M}_{DoS}^c$  are those  $\mathfrak{W}$  for which  $C(\mathfrak{W})>0$
- $\mathcal{M}_{DoS}$  are those  $\mathfrak{W}$  for which a denial-of-service attack is possible, i.e.,  $\mathfrak{W} \in \mathcal{CH}_c(\mathfrak{X}, \mathcal{S}; \mathcal{Y})$  with  $C(\mathfrak{W}) = 0$

$$\mathcal{M}_{\mathsf{DoS}} = \{ \mathfrak{W} \in \mathcal{CH}_c(\mathfrak{X}, \mathcal{S}; \mathcal{Y}) : F(\mathfrak{W}) = 0 \}$$

- Since  $\mathcal{M}_{\mathsf{DoS}}$  is characterized by the continuous function  $F(\cdot)$ , the set is well defined
- ⇒ Analytically, this is easy to answer! And algorithmically...?

Question 1: Is there an algorithm (or Turing machine)  $\mathfrak{T}$  that takes  $\mathfrak{W}$  as an input and outputs  $\mathfrak{T}(\mathfrak{W}) = 1$  if the Jammer is able to perform a denial-of-service attack and otherwise outputs  $\mathfrak{T}(\mathfrak{W}) = 0$ ?

Question 2: Is there an algorithm (or Turing machine)  $\mathfrak{T}'$  that takes  $\mathfrak{W}$  as an input and stops if the Jammer is not able to perform a denial-of-service attack, i.e., whenever  $C(\mathfrak{W}) > 0$ ?

- Framework also important for system evaluation and verification
- H. Boche, R. F. Schaefer, and H. V. Poor, "Performance evaluation of secure communication systems on Turing machines," in *Proc.* 10th IEEE Int. Workshop Inf. Forensics Security, Hong Kong, Dec. 2018, pp. 1–7

## Computability

• A sequence of rational numbers  $\{r_n\}_{n\in\mathbb{N}}$  is called *computable* if there exist recursive functions  $a,b,s:\mathbb{N}\to\mathbb{N}$  with  $b(n)\neq 0$  for all  $n\in\mathbb{N}$  and

$$r_n = (-1)^{s(n)} \frac{a(n)}{b(n)}, \qquad n \in \mathbb{N}$$

• A real number x is said to be computable if there exists a computable sequence of rational numbers  $\{r_n\}_{n\in\mathbb{N}}$  such that

$$|x-r_n| < 2^{-n}$$
 for all  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ 

- ullet  $\mathbb{R}_c$  is the set of computable real numbers
- $\mathcal{P}_c(\mathfrak{X})$  is the set of computable probability distributions (i.e., all  $P \in \mathcal{P}(\mathfrak{X})$  such that  $P(x) \in \mathbb{R}_c$ ,  $x \in \mathfrak{X}$ )
- $\mathcal{CH}_c(\mathfrak{X}; \mathfrak{Y})$  is the set of all computable channels (i.e., for  $W: \mathfrak{X} \to \mathcal{P}(\mathfrak{Y})$  we have  $W(\cdot|x) \in \mathcal{P}_c(\mathfrak{Y})$  for every  $x \in \mathfrak{X}$ )

**Definition:** A function  $f: \mathbb{R}_c \to \mathbb{R}_c$  is called *Borel computable* if there is an algorithm that transforms each given computable sequence of a computable real x into a corresponding representation for f(x).

R. I. Soare, Recursively Enumerable Sets and Degrees. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 1987

### Detectability

**Theorem:** For all  $|\mathfrak{X}| \geqslant 2$ ,  $|\mathfrak{S}| \geqslant 2$ , and  $|\mathfrak{Y}| \geqslant 2$ , there is **no** Turing machine  $\mathfrak{T}: \mathfrak{CH}_c(\mathfrak{X}, \mathfrak{S}; \mathfrak{Y}) \to \{0, 1\}$  with  $\mathfrak{T}(\mathfrak{W}) = 1$  if and only if  $\mathfrak{W} \in \mathfrak{M}_{DoS}$ .

- We look for a Turing machine that stops for every channel  $\mathfrak{W} \in \mathcal{CH}_c(\mathfrak{X}, \mathcal{S}; \mathcal{Y})$  and further  $\mathfrak{T}(\mathfrak{W}) = 1$  if and only if  $\mathfrak{W} \in \mathcal{M}_{DoS}$
- ⇒ Such a Turing machine does **not** exist
- ⇒ This question is algorithmically undecidable!
- $\Rightarrow$  This provides a negative answer to Question 1
- Drop requirement of stopping:
- Is there a Turing machine that stops if and only if  $\mathfrak{W} \in \mathcal{M}^c_{DoS}$ ? Otherwise, the Turing machine may not stop at all

**Theorem:** There is a Turing machine  $\mathfrak{T}: \mathcal{CH}_c(\mathfrak{X}, \mathcal{S}; \mathcal{Y}) \to \{\text{stop, run forever}\}\$  that stops if and only if  $\mathfrak{W} \in \mathcal{M}_{DoS}^c$ , i.e., no denial-of-service attack is possible.

- ⇒ Such a Turing machine does exist
- ⇒ This question is **algorithmically semidecidable**!
- ⇒ This provides a positive answer to Question 2
- A similar approach for  $\mathcal{M}_{DoS}$  (as done for  $\mathcal{M}^c_{DoS}$ ) is not possible (otherwise it would then be possible to simply run both machines in parallel)

**Theorem:** There is **no** Turing machine  $\mathfrak{T}: \mathcal{CH}_c(\mathfrak{X}, \mathcal{S}; \mathcal{Y}) \to \{\text{stop, run forever}\}$  that stops if and only if  $\mathfrak{W} \in \mathcal{M}_{DoS}$ .

⇒ This question is **algorithmically not semidecidable**!

## Jammer with Full Knowledge

- Jammer knows the actual transmitted message!
- ⇒ AVC with maximum error for which capacity is unknown

**Theorem:** For an AVC  $\mathfrak W$  under the maximum error criterion, we have  $C_{max} > 0$  if and only if there exist  $x, \hat{x} \in \mathfrak X$  with  $\mathfrak I(x) \cap \mathfrak I(\hat{x}) \neq \emptyset$ . with  $\mathfrak I(x) = \{p \in \mathfrak P(\mathfrak Y) : \exists q \in \mathfrak P(\mathfrak S) \text{ s.t. } p(y) = \sum_{s \in \mathfrak S} W(y|x,s)q(s)\}$ 

- R. Ahlswede, "Elimination of correlation in random codes for arbitrarily varying channels," Z. Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie verw. Gebiete, vol. 44, no. 2, pp. 159–175, Jun. 1978
- ullet  $\overline{\mathcal{M}}_{\mathsf{DoS}}$  are those  ${\mathfrak W}$  for which a denial-of-service attack is possible

**Theorem:** For all  $|\mathfrak{X}| \geqslant 2$ ,  $|\mathfrak{S}| \geqslant 2$ , and  $|\mathfrak{Y}| \geqslant 2$ , there is **no** Turing machine  $\mathfrak{T}: \mathfrak{CH}_c(\mathfrak{X}, \mathfrak{S}; \mathfrak{Y}) \to \{0, 1\}$  with  $\mathfrak{T}(\mathfrak{W}) = 1$  if and only if  $\mathfrak{W} \in \overline{\mathcal{M}}_{DoS}$ .

**Theorem:** There is a Turing machine  $\mathfrak{T}: \mathcal{CH}_c(\mathfrak{X}, \mathcal{S}; \mathcal{Y}) \to \{\text{stop, run forever}\}$  that stops if and only if  $\mathfrak{W} \in \overline{\mathcal{M}}_{DoS}^c$ , i.e., no denial-of-service attack is possible.

H. Boche, R. F. Schaefer, and H. V. Poor, "Denial-of-service attacks on communication systems: Detectability and jammer knowledge," 2019, in preparation

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