Northeastern

MAC ID Spoofing-Resistant Radio Fingerprinting

Tong Jian, Bruno Costa Rendon, Andrey Gritsenko, Jennifer Dy, Kaushik Chowdhury, and Stratis Ioannidis

Radio Fingerprinting

- Detecting **transmission source** of signals is a key security mechanism



! Demodulation:
- protocol-specific
- limits ability of detection over new packet frame structures, channel bandwidths, modulation choices, and coding schemes

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

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



*K. Sankhe, M. Belgiovine,F. Zhou, S. Riyaz, S. Ioannidis, and K. R. Chowdhury, "ORACLE: Optimized Radio clAssification through Convolutional neuraL nEtworks," IEEE INFOCOM 2019, Paris, France, May. 2019

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



Signatures (Unique I/Q distortions): unchanging, hardware-based characteristics of the transmitter

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Radio Fingerprinting

- Need for CNNs:
  - End-to-End feature interpreters -> protocol-independent

Radio Fingerprinting

- Need for CNNs:
  - End-to-End feature interpreters -> protocol-independent
  - Demonstrated performance record on numerous inference problems across application domains





upper right: NLP
lower right ImageNet
left: Object Detection

Challenges

- Features extracted by deep models cannot be easily interpreted!!!

Indeed learns unique **I/Q distortions**	**OR**	Simply picking up **artifacts** present in the data

- Unfortunately, almost all transmissions contain a strongly discriminative artifact, **the identity of the transmitting device**, which is often included in a transmitted packet

ADS-B



Source: https://www.mathworks.com/help/examples/xilinxzynqbasedradio_product/win64/zynqRadioHWSWADSBAD9361AD9364SL_ModeS_PPM.png

Challenges

- Features extracted by deep models cannot be easily interpreted!!!

Indeed learns unique **I/Q distortions**

OR

Simply picking up **artifacts** present in the data

- If latter...

Transmitter

Our Contributions

- Slicing technique
  - makes the classifier **resistant** to learning **MAC IDs** as features

- Experiments on WiFi and ADS-B demonstrate slicing helps
  - **100 %** -> **bitwise identical** transmissions by 19 devices
  - **99.7%** -> **MAC ID** in the test set are shuffled

Overview

- Framework
- Experiments on WiFi protocol
- Experiments on ADS-B protocol

Overview

- Methodology
- Experiments on WiFi protocol
- Experiments on ADS-B protocol

Methodology: Architecture

- CNN Architecture



Methodology: Slicing

- Slicing [Riyaz et al]



*Riyaz, K. Sankhe, S. Ioannidis, and K. Chowdhury, "Deep learning convolutional neural networks for radio identification," IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 56, no. 9, pp. 146–152, 2018.

Methodology: Slicing

- Randomized slicing:



- For each transmission k, we sample $n_k = \frac{M_k - L + 1}{L} \cdot \kappa$ slices uniformly at random from all generated slices

Methodology: Testing

- We evaluate per-slice accuracy on test set
- We also evaluate per-transmission accuracy
  - Suppose there are N devices, and transmission k has n_k slices
  - p_{ij} is the probability of slice j classified as belonging to device i
    - Sum of probability over all slices: $\hat{y} = \arg\max_i \sum_{j=1}^{n_k} p_{ij}$



Methodology

- Advantages of randomized slicing:
  - satisfies the requirement of fixed-size input for CNNs
  - improves classifier's ability to learn shift-invariant features
  - reduces computations during training

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- Experiments on ADS-B protocol

Experiments on WiFi protocol

- Datasets:
  - Bitwise Identical WiFi:

Bitwise identical WiFi transmissions by 19 devices.



Experiments on WiFi protocol

- Datasets:
  - Bitwise Identical WiFi:

    Bitwise identical WiFi transmissions by 19 devices.

Dataset	# Devices	# Train transmission/device	# Test transmission/device	Average transmission length
Bitwise Identical WiFi	19	8953	2238	20088

- Results:

Dataset	Slice length	Accuracy Per-slice / Per-transmission
Bitwise Identical WiFi	128	0.778/1.000



Experiments on WiFi protocol

- Datasets:
  - Scrambled MAC WiFi:

    MAC IDs are randomly permuted among the signals in the test set.



Experiments on WiFi protocol

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Dataset	# Devices	# Train transmission/device	# Test transmission/device	Average transmission length
Scrambled MAC WiFi	100	1000	1000	45183

- Results:

Dataset	Slice length	Accuracy Per-slice / Per-transmission
Scrambled MAC WiFi	1024	0.972/0.997



Overview

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- Experiments on ADS-B protocol

Experiments on ADS-B protocol

- Datasets:

Dataset	# Devices	# Train transmission/device	# Test transmission/device	Average transmission length
ADS-B	50	141	55	9519



Crop

Experiments on ADS-B protocol

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

Fig. Test Accuracy without Slicing

Experiments on ADS-B protocol

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

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

Fig. Test Accuracy with Slicing

Summary & Future Directions

- Classifying transmission slices
  - enhances **shift-invariance**
  - MAC ID spoofing-resistant
  - experiments on WiFi and ADS-B protocols.

- We are working on...
  - classification over >10K transmitters
  - beating channel variations

thank you
danke
рахмат
謝謝
ngiyabonga
شكراً جزيلاً
teşekkür ederim
Баярлалаа
спасибо
faafetai lava
mersi
kia ora
barka
welalin
tack
spas
dank je
misaotra
matondo
paldies
grazzi
mahalo
tapadh leat
vinaka
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nanni
nandri
dhanyavad
mauruuru
köszönöm
hvala
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bayarlalaa
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