


Improving Cross-dataset Performance of Face Presentation Attack Detection Systems Using Face Recognition Datasets

ICASSP 2020

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Outline

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2. Related Work
3. Proposed Method
4. Experiments
5. Conclusions

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Face Recognition (FR)

FR systems are vulnerable to presentation attacks.



Examples of presentation attacks (PA): print attack (left) and 3D rigid mask attack (right).

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
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Presentation Attack Detection (PAD)



PAD systems are binary classification systems.

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Presentation Attack Detection (PAD)

Bona Fide



Replay PA



Print Mask PA



Print PA



PAD systems rely on artifacts present in presentation attacks to detect them.

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
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PAD Using Deep Learning




CNN based PAD approaches outperform previous methods which use hand-crafted features¹²³.

¹J. Yang, Z. Lei, and S. Z. Li. "Learn Convolutional Neural Network for Face Anti-Spoofing". In: *arXiv:1408.5601 [cs]* (Aug. 2014).

²K. Patel, H. Han, and A. Jain. "Cross-Database Face Antispoofing with Robust Feature Representation". In: *Chinese Conference on Biometric Recognition. 2016*.

³Z. Boulkenafet, J. Komulainen, Z. Akhtar, et al. "A Competition on Generalized Software-Based Face Presentation Attack Detection in Mobile Scenarios". In: *Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Biometrics, 2017. Oct. 2017*.

Problem: Generalization in PAD



Intra-dataset vs cross-dataset PAD evaluation.

- Cross-dataset evaluations represent real-world scenarios.

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
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Domain Shift

▲ OULU-NPU



Visualization of learned features of a PAD CNN using TSNE.
The PAD CNN is trained on the OULU-NPU dataset.

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
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
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Nuisance Factors⁴



Domain shift is caused by variations of nuisance factors

⁴https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuisance_variable

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Nuisance Factors

Nuisance factors include:

- camera device
- distance of the subject from the camera
- instrument used to create the attack
- lighting conditions
- identity, pose, etc.

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Nuisance Factors

Nuisance factors include:

- camera device
- distance of the subject from the camera
- instrument used to create the attack
- lighting conditions
- identity, pose, etc.

Current face PAD datasets contain limited variations of nuisance factors.

- Less than 10 camera devices
- 50 to 150 identities
- Limited variations in lighting conditions and pose

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Related Work: Domain Generalization Methods

Most methods account for domain shift by learning features that are domain invariant:




Diagram of a typical domain generalization method.

MMD: Maximum Mean Discrepancy⁵

⁵A. Gretton et al. "A Kernel Two-Sample Test". In: *Journal of Machine Learning Research* 13:Mar (2012).

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What is a domain?

1. Each camera device is a domain and MMD is used⁶.
2. Each PAD dataset is a domain and an adversarial loss is used⁷.

⁶H. Li et al. "Learning Generalized Deep Feature Representation for Face Anti-Spoofing". In: *IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security* 13.10 (Oct. 2018).

⁷R. Shao et al. "Multi-Adversarial Discriminative Deep Domain Generalization for Face Presentation Attack Detection". In: *The IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR)*. June 2019.



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Downsides of most domain generalization methods:

- Domain needs to be defined.
- Data from each domain is needed.



Proposed Method: Motivation

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How can we account for nuisance factors?

Some nuisance factors are common between *bona fide* and presentation attacks, such as:

- identities
- camera devices
- lighting conditions

Some nuisance factors are specific to presentation attacks, such as:

- presentation attack instruments



Nuisance Factors

Current face PAD datasets contain limited variations of nuisance factors.

- Less than 10 camera devices
 - 50 to 150 identities
 - Limited variations in lighting conditions and pose
-

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Nuisance Factors

Current face PAD datasets contain limited variations of nuisance factors.

- Less than 10 camera devices
- 50 to 150 identities
- Limited variations in lighting conditions and pose

Face recognition datasets contain large variations of many of those nuisance factors.

- Hundreds of different camera devices
- More than 100,000 identities
- Faces captured in the *wild* with a variety of lighting conditions and pose

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Hypothesis

All the underlying factors that explain the data in a face recognition dataset (which contains only *bona fide* samples) are nuisance factors in a face PAD system.

- Face PAD datasets contain limited variations of nuisance factors.
- Face recognition datasets are much larger and more varied and can help us model the common nuisance factors.



Proposed Method

$$\text{Assume: } \mathbf{I} = f(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z}_1, \mathbf{z}_2) + \epsilon$$

- \mathbf{I} is a face image.
- f is a function.
- \mathbf{y} is the variable that we want to predict – whether \mathbf{I} is a PA.
- \mathbf{z}_1 is the variable that represents nuisance factors **common** between two classes.
- \mathbf{z}_2 is the variable that represents nuisance factors exclusive to presentation attacks.
- ϵ is noise.

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Proposed Method

$$\text{Assume: } f(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z}_1, \mathbf{z}_2) = g(\mathbf{z}_1) + h(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z}_2)$$

- g and h are functions that produce images given their respective latent variables.

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Proposed Method

$$\text{Assume: } f(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z}_1, \mathbf{z}_2) = g(\mathbf{z}_1) + h(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z}_2)$$

- g and h are functions that produce images given their respective latent variables.

$$\text{Assume: } \mathbf{z}_1 = e(\mathbf{I}),$$

- e and g are the functions that we want to model.

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Proposed Method

$$\text{Assume: } f(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z}_1, \mathbf{z}_2) = g(\mathbf{z}_1) + h(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z}_2)$$

- g and h are functions that produce images given their respective latent variables.

$$\text{Assume: } \mathbf{z}_1 = e(\mathbf{l}),$$

$$\mathbf{l}_{z_1} = g(\mathbf{z}_1) = g(e(\mathbf{l})),$$

- e and g are the functions that we want to model.

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Assume: $f(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z}_1, \mathbf{z}_2) = g(\mathbf{z}_1) + h(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z}_2)$

- g and h are functions that produce images given their respective latent variables.

Assume: $\mathbf{z}_1 = e(\mathbf{l})$,


$$\mathbf{l}_{z_1} = g(\mathbf{z}_1) = g(e(\mathbf{l})),$$

$$h(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z}_2) \cong \mathbf{l} - \mathbf{l}_{z_1} = \mathbf{l}_{y, z_2}$$

- e and g are the functions that we want to model.



Proposed Method Using Deep Autoencoders



Autoencoders can model the factors present in data.

- Using a face recognition dataset to train an autoencoder allows us to accurately model z_1 nuisance factors.

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
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Proposed Method Using Deep Autoencoders



- The proposed method adds a pre-processing step to traditional methods.

$$I_{z_1} = g(z_1) = g(e(I))$$
$$h(y, z_2) \approx I - I_{z_1} = I_{y, z_2}$$

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Autoencoder Details

- InfoVAE (a variational autoencoder) was used in the experiments.
- Encoder: DenseNet-161⁸
- Decoder: 7 layer deep CNN⁹
- Dimension of \mathbf{z}_1 : 256
- Prior distribution: $\mathcal{N}(0, 3)$ (diagonal covariance matrix)
- Face recognition datasets: cleaned versions of Microsoft Celeb (MS-Celeb-1M)¹⁰ and the Celeb-A¹¹

⁸G. Huang et al. "Densely Connected Convolutional Networks". In: *Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition*. 2017.

⁹T. Miyato et al. "Spectral Normalization for Generative Adversarial Networks". In: *International Conference on Learning Representations*. 2018.

¹⁰Y. Guo et al. "MS-Celeb-1M: A Dataset and Benchmark for Large-Scale Face Recognition". In: *arXiv preprint arXiv:1607.08221* (2016).

¹¹Z. Liu et al. "Deep Learning Face Attributes in the Wild". In: *Proceedings of International Conference on Computer Vision (ICCV)*. Dec. 2015.

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


Experiments

Evaluation of 3 PAD systems:

- DeepPixBiS¹² as a baseline PAD CNN.

- Autoencoder Error (AE, proposed method) based on DeepPixBiS.




- Blur Error (BE) – Similar to AE but a Gaussian blur filter is used instead of an autoencoder.

- $I_{BE} = I - I_{blurred}$


¹²A. George and S. Marcel. "Deep Pixel-Wise Binary Supervision for Face Presentation Attack Detection". In: *International Conference on Biometrics*. 2019.

Input images of different systems


Original



Autoencoder



Blurred



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Datasets

Experiments are done using 4 recent face PAD datasets

- OULU-NPU¹³
- Replay-Mobile¹⁴
- SWAN¹⁵
- WMCA¹⁶

All PAD methods are trained on OULU-NPU and tested on all datasets.

¹³Z. Boulkenafet, J. Komulainen, L. Li, et al. "OULU-NPU: A Mobile Face Presentation Attack Database with Real-World Variations". In: *Automatic Face & Gesture Recognition (FG 2017), 2017 12th IEEE International Conference On*. 2017

¹⁴A. Costa-Pazo et al. "The REPLAY-MOBILE Face Presentation-Attack Database". In: *Biometrics Special Interest Group (BIOSIG), 2016 International Conference of The*. 2016

¹⁵R. Ramachandra et al. "Smartphone Multi-Modal Biometric Authentication: Database and Evaluation". In: *arXiv:1912.02487 [cs] (Dec. 2019)*

¹⁶A. George et al. "Biometric Face Presentation Attack Detection with Multi-Channel Convolutional Neural Network". In: *IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security (2019)*

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
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Intra-dataset and Cross-dataset Evaluations



- Area under the curve (AUC) of the ROC plots is reported.
- Comparison of intra-dataset (OULU-NPU) versus cross-dataset (Replay-Mobile, SWAN, WMCA) evaluations.

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Conclusions

- All the factors present in face recognition datasets can be seen as nuisance factors for face PAD.
- Autoencoders can be used to explicitly model these nuisance factors.

The proposed method:

- Decreased the intra-dataset performance.
- Increased the cross-dataset performance.

Code and models available at: https://gitlab.idiap.ch/bob/bob.paper.icassp2020_facepad_generalization_infvae

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