Adversarial Networks for Secure Wireless Communications

Thomas Marchioro Nicola Laurenti Deniz Gündüz Wiretap channel: A wants to transmit U to B, E has access to the channel, but with additional distortion



Secrecy capacity C_s = maximum rate satisfying

1. Reliability:
$$\lim_{n \to \infty} P[\widehat{U} \neq U] = 0$$

2. Secrecy:
$$\lim_{n \to \infty} I(U, Z^n) = 0$$

A less stringent formulation

The condition

$$\lim_{n\to\infty} I(U,Z^n) = 0$$

might be too strict in some cases.

Example: A wants to transmit an image (U) representing a car to B but doesn't want E to know that it represents a car (S).

The image contains a lot of information, and not all that information is useful for classification.





Useful information U to be transmitted to B Sensitive information S to be kept secret from E



Physical layer secrecy

Reliability:
$$\lim_{n \to \infty} P[\widehat{U} \neq U] = 0$$

Secrecy:
$$\lim_{n \to \infty} I(U; Z^n) = 0$$

Our problem

] Quality:
$$\mathbb{E} ig[d ig(U, \widehat{U} ig) ig] \leq arepsilon_n$$

$$\square Privacy: I(S; Z^n) \le \delta_n$$

Optimization problem

□ Quality: $\mathbb{E}[d(U, \widehat{U})] \le \varepsilon_n$ □ Privacy: $I(S; Z^n) \le \delta_n$

$\min_{\substack{p_{X^n|US}, f_B}} \mathbb{E}[d(U, \widehat{U})] + \alpha I(S; Z^n)$ $\widehat{\Upsilon}$ Tradeoff parameter

Lower bound on $I(S; Z^n)$

Mutual information between S and Z^n :

$$I(S;Z^{n}) = \sum_{s} p_{S}(s) \sum_{z^{n}} p_{Z^{n}|S}(z^{n}|s) \log \frac{p_{Z^{n}|S}(z^{n}|s)}{p_{Z^{n}}(z^{n})}$$

$$\widehat{\Gamma}$$
Requires to estimate

conditional distributions

Alternative formulation:

$$\min_{p_{X^{n}|US},f_{B}} \mathbb{E}[d(U,\widehat{U})] + \alpha \left(\max_{Q_{S|Z^{n}}} \left(-H(e_{s},q) \right) \right)$$

 e_S = one hot encoding of *S*

Variational lower bound

q = adversary likelihood estimation

The problem

$$\min_{P_X n_{|US}, f_B} \left\{ \mathbb{E} \left[d \left(U, \widehat{U} \right) \right] + \alpha \max_{Q_{S|Z} n} \left(-H(e_S, q) \right) \right\}$$

can be interpreted as a minimax game.

□ (A,B) needs to minimize $\mathcal{L}_{AB} = \mathbb{E}[d(U, \hat{U})] - \alpha H(e_S, q)$ □ E needs to minimize $\mathcal{L}_M = H(e_S, q)$

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Application: transmitting images while preventing the eavesdropper from correctly classifying the class.



Adversarial network model



At each training cycle E's estimation is brought to be independent of S after training (A,B), then the subsequent training of E partly recovers the missing information.



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Main idea: rather than maximizing the cross-entropy between the one-hot encoding and the softmax, minimize the crossentropy between the distribution \bar{p} and the softmax, where

$$\bar{p} = \left[\frac{1}{\ell}, \frac{1}{\ell}, \dots, \frac{1}{\ell}\right]^{\mathsf{T}}, \qquad \ell = \# \text{ of classes}$$

□ (A,B) needs to minimize

$$\mathcal{L}_{AB} = \mathbb{E}[d(U, \hat{U})] + \alpha H(\bar{p}, q)$$

E needs to minimize

$$\mathcal{L}_M = H(e_S, q)$$

Softmax equalization is more stable and the results are subject to less variance.



Test results

Main parameters: quality-privacy tradeoff α , SNR of E. SNR of (A, B) = 10 dB.



Test results

$$\alpha = 1$$
, SNR of B = 10 Accuracy



Conclusions

We have:

- introduced a relaxed privacy condition with respect to physical layer secrecy to protect sensitive information only
- proposed a general formulation of the corresponding minimax problem
- applied this formulation to secure image transmission employing adversarial neural networks
- shown that it is possible to regulate the tradeoff between quality and privacy and to exploit the channel advantage to achieve better secrecy.

Future work

- Train the model with fading channels to improve the scalability for SNR variations
- Introduce a stochastic encoder to improve the quality-privacy tradeoff

THANK YOU!