On Securing Cloud-Hosted Cyber-Physical Systems Using Trusted Execution Environments

A.M. Naseri, W. Lucia, M. Mannan, A. Youssef





ICAS2021, Montreal, Canada

A.M. Naseri, W. Lucia, M. Mannan, A. Youssef (CIISE, Concordia Univ.)

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Introduction to Cloud-Hosted CPS

Cloud-Hosted CPSs

- Introduction to Cloud-Hosted CPS

What is a Cyber-Physical System (CPS)?

- CPS is the term used to denote physical systems equipped with computation and communication capabilities.
- From a control point of view, CPSs can be modeled as networked control systems that can be compromised by cyber-attacks.



 Hassan, M.U., Rehmani, M.H. and Chen, J., 2019. Differential privacy techniques for cyber physical systems: a survey. IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutorials, 22(1), pp.746-789.

- Introduction to Cloud-Hosted CPS

Cloud-Hosted CPSs

- Setup: The controller is implemented on a cloud service.
- Advantages:
 - High Computational Power
 - Wide Range of Availability
 - Setup and Maintenance Cost Reduction
- Disadvantages:
 - Security and Privacy of Cloud and Communication Channels



Problem Formulation

Cloud-Hosted CPSs - Vulnerabilities

- Communication Channels Vulnerabilities
 - Eavesdropper on the Communication Channel
 - Modify Transmitted data on the channel
- Cloud Service Vulnerabilities
 - Insider/Outsider Attackers
 - Malware Infected Cloud



Existing Solutions

Encrypted Control Systems Using Conventional Cryptosystems

- Advantages:
 - Confidentiality of the channel is guaranteed.
- Disadvantages:
 - Cloud-service attack scenarios still feasible.
 - Key should be stored on the cloud.
 - Extra computational load for encryption/decryption.



Encrypted Control Systems Using HE (1/2)

- Advantage:
 - Perform arithmetic operations on encrypted data.
 - Confidentiality of the channels is guaranteed.
 - There is no need to store the key on the cloud.
- Disadvantages:
 - Homomorphic Encryption Malleability.
 - Ciphertext expansion and extra communication load.
 - Confidentiality of the control logic can be violated.



Encrypted Control Systems Using HE (2/2)

- Disadvantages (Cont.):
 - Control logic design is limited by the number and type of operations supported by the HE.
 - Advanced control strategies might require a re-design.



Effectiveness of Existing Solutions

- Limitations in terms of security/privacy/deployability.
- Still vulnerable against cloud-service attacks.



Proposed Security Solution based on TEE

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Proposed Architecture

- The objectives of our proposal:
 - Secure the cloud-based CPSs against all the cyber-threat discussed.
 - Reduce the impact on the design and implementation of existing control strategies.
- For these purposes, we utilize: A Trusted Execution Environment (TEE).
 - A hardware-based solution, which provides an isolated environment to keep data and run code.
 - Any unauthorized access to the isolated environment is not possible, even by the operating system(OS).
 - It is assumed to be secure against any insider/outsider attacker, malware, or even a compromised OS.

Implementation

- TEE: Intel Software Guard Extension (SGX)
 - Provides a cryptographic attestation to ensure the integrity of control algorithm.
 - To keep code, data, and encryption key; SGX provides an isolated environment called "Enclave."
- AES-128 Galois/Counter Mode (GCM)
 - High throughput
 - Low latency



Closed-Loop Control System Flow with TEE



Security Analysis

- Confidentiality:
 - Encrypted data are sent over the channels.
 - The control algorithm, encryption/decryption operations are performed inside an enclave.
- Integrity and Authentication:
 - AES-128 GCM MAC tag ensures secure and authenticated communications.
 - Intel SGX attestation mechanism ensures control logic integrity

Experimental Results

Experimental Results

A.M. Naseri, W. Lucia, M. Mannan, A. Youssef (CIISE, Concordia Univ.) ICAS2021, Montreal, Canada

- Experimental Results

Test Bed Setup

- Outside SGX:
 - Test Bed: Quadruple Tank Process.
- Inside SGX:
 - The LQG¹ controller implemented on the cloud and inside Intel SGX.



¹Composed of a Kalman Filter + Linear Quadratic Controller

-Experimental Results

Measurements

- For simulation and time measurements we utilized an Intel Core i7-6700 CPU, which supports Intel SGX.
- Sampling time of the system is $T_s = 0.1 sec$
- Measurements are an average time for 1000 times repeat of each operation.
- Δt is the additional introduced overhead.
- The average total CPU time required by both of the with SGX and without SGX implementations are $466.7+1.8+1.4+435.4=905.3\mu s$ and $466.7+1.8+1.4=469.9\mu s$



Operation	Time (μs)
Dynamic output feedback controller	466.7
AES-128 GCM encryption	1.8
AES-128 GCM decryption	1.4
Δt	435.4

Conclusion

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A.M. Naseri, W. Lucia, M. Mannan, A. Youssef (CIISE, Concordia Univ.) ICAS2021, Montreal, Canada 21/23

- Conclusion

Conclusion

- We proposed a solution to secure cloud-hosted/edge-hosted CPSs.
- The proposed networked control scheme is secure again different attacks against its security and privacy.
- The effectiveness of such a scheme is verified by means of numerical simulations.
- The obtained results show good promise in terms of realtime performance in CPSs applications.
- The proposed solution can also be implemented in a non cloud setting to help mitigating supply chain breaches.

Conclusion

Thank You!

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