


# Introduction

- Although image transformation-based defenses were widely considered at an earlier time, most of them have been defeated by adaptive attacks.
- We propose a new image transformation defense based on error diffusion halftoning, and combine it with adversarial training to defend against adversarial examples.
- Error diffusion halftoning projects an image into a 1-bit space and diffuses quantization error to neighboring pixels
- This process can remove adversarial perturbations from a given image while maintaining acceptable image quality in the meantime in favor of recognition.
- The proposed method can improve adversarial robustness even under advanced adaptive attacks, while most of the other image transformation-based defenses do not.

Input image (I)

Halftone (Q)



## Prior Works

- JPEG compression
- Bit-depth reduction
- Image denoising
- Gaussian blur
- Mean/median filter
- Non-local means
- ...etc [1]

Defense	Dataset	Distance	Accuracy	
Buckman et al. (2018)	CIFAR	$0.031  (\ell_{\infty})$	0%*	
Ma et al. (2018)	CIFAR	$0.031  (\ell_{\infty})$	5%	
Guo et al. (2018)	ImageNet	$0.005(\ell_2)$	0%*	
Dhillon et al. (2018)	CIFAR	$0.031  (\ell_{\infty})$	0%	
Xie et al. (2018)	ImageNet	$0.031  (\ell_{\infty})$	0%*	
Song et al. (2018)	CIFAR	$0.031  (\ell_{\infty})$	9%*	
Samangouei et al. (2018)	MNIST	$0.005(\ell_2)$	55%**	

- Most existing image transformation-based defenses are NOT robust against white-box attacks [2].

# Error Diffusion Halftoning Against Adversarial Examples

# Shao-Yuan Lo and Vishal M.Patel

## Johns Hopkins University | Whiting School of Engineering | Baltimore, MD


### Error diffusion halftoning: Floyd-Steinberg dithering

- Quantize each pixel in the raster order (from left to right, top to bottom) one-by-one, and spread the quantization error to the neighboring pixels.
- Beginning with the top-left pixel, the pixel value is binarized by thresholding, then the quantization error is dispersed to neighboring pixels using pre-defined weights.
- Following the raster-scan indexing scheme, the procedure continues until the bottom-right pixel has been transformed.

$$\hat{f}(i,j) = I(i,j) + \sum_{m,n \in S} h(m,n)e(i-m,j-n)$$
  
 $O(i,j) = u(\hat{I}(i,j) - \theta)$ 

$$Q(i,j) = u(I(i,j) - \theta)$$

$$e(i,j) = \hat{I}(i,j) - Q(i,j)$$



- The quantization operation invalid the adversarial variations.


- Updating the values of the neighboring pixels repeatedly makes the adaptive attacks hard to identify the mapping between the original image and the corresponding halftone.
- Spreading quantization errors produces better halftoning quality and tends to enhance edges and object boundary in an image.
- Take **both** adversarial robustness and clean data performance.
- Complementary to adversarial training.


## References

[1] E. Raff, J. Sylvester, S. Forsyth, and M. McLean, "Barrage of random transforms for adversarially robust defense," in IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, 2019

[2] A. Athalye, N. Carlini, and D. Wagner, "Obfuscated gradients give a false sense of security: Circumventing defenses to adversarial examples," in International Conference on Machine Learning, 2018.

## d Method





### Method Vanilla Gaussian blur Non-local mean

JPEG compressi Bit-depth reduct Halftoning (our Vanilla Gaussian blur Non-local mean JPEG compressi Bit-depth reduct Halftoning (ours

## **Feature Visualization**

Transformed image

Feature at th last conv laye

Transformed image

Feature at th last conv laye

### **Feature Analysis**






IEEE Signal Processing

## Results

### **Quantitative Results**

10	Training	Clean	PGD- $\ell_{\infty}$	$PGD-\ell_2$	$Mult{-}\ell_\infty$	Mult-l <sub>2</sub>	Avgadv	Avgall
ns sion ction rs)	Standard training	<b>94.03</b> <u>90.17</u> 88.66 90.06 78.87 88.57	0.01 0.20 0.02 2.97 <b>15.26</b> <u>9.53</u>	0.20 1.34 0.49 4.82 <u>10.84</u> <b>11.98</b>	0.05 0.17 0.03 1.81 <b>10.79</b> <u>5.54</u>	0.01 0.05 0.00 0.22 <b>4.52</b> <u>1.07</u>	0.07 0.44 0.14 2.46 <b>10.35</b> <u>7.03</u>	18.86 18.39 17.84 19.98 <b>24.06</b> 23.34
ns sion ction rs)	Adversarial training	83.31 75.96 75.47 24.97 71.66 84.37	<u>51.15</u> 44.59 44.67 38.99 47.34 <b>60.01</b>	50.68 47.12 45.29 43.72 42.40 56.56	54.10 45.07 16.59 <u>59.15</u> 48.50 <b>67.37</b>	40.29 32.48 14.53 <u>44.72</u> 41.63 <b>88.44</b>	49.06 42.32 30.27 46.65 44.97 <b>68.10</b>	55.91 49.04 39.31 42.31 50.31 <b>71.35</b>

	Vanilla	Gaussian blur	Non-local means	JPEG	Bit-depth reduction	Halftone
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he /er						
ed						
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## Acknowledgement

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## Code