



Error Diffusion Halftoning Against Adversarial Examples

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Recall: Adversarial Examples

$$x_{adv} = x + \delta$$

$$f(x_{adv}) \neq y$$

Recall: Adversarial Examples

- Deep networks are **vulnerable** to adversarial examples.



x

“panda”

57.7% confidence

+ .007 ×



$\text{sign}(\nabla_x J(\theta, x, y))$

“nematode”

8.2% confidence

=



$x +$


$\epsilon \text{sign}(\nabla_x J(\theta, x, y))$

“gibbon”

99.3 % confidence

Recall: Adversarial Examples

- White-box attack
- Black-box attack
- Gray-box attack



Defense Methods

- **Adversarial training:** Enhance the robustness of networks itself.

$$\theta^* = \arg \min_{\theta} \mathbb{E}_{(x,y) \sim \mathbb{D}} \left[\max_{\delta \in \mathcal{S}} L(x + \delta, y; \theta) \right]$$

- **Image transformation:** Remove perturbations from input images.

$$C(x_{adv}) \neq y.$$

$$C(T(x_{adv})) = y.$$

Image Transformation-based Defenses

- JPEG compression
- Bit-depth reduction
- Image denoising
 - Gaussian blur
 - Mean/median filter
 - Non-local means
- ...etc

Image Transformation-based Defenses

- Most existing image transformation-based defenses are **NOT** robust against **white-box attacks**.

Defense	Dataset	Distance	Accuracy
Buckman et al. (2018)	CIFAR	0.031 (l_∞)	0%*
Ma et al. (2018)	CIFAR	0.031 (l_∞)	5%
Guo et al. (2018)	ImageNet	0.005 (l_2)	0%*
Dhillon et al. (2018)	CIFAR	0.031 (l_∞)	0%
Xie et al. (2018)	ImageNet	0.031 (l_∞)	0%*
Song et al. (2018)	CIFAR	0.031 (l_∞)	9%*
Samangouei et al. (2018)	MNIST	0.005 (l_2)	55%**

Proposed Method: Error Diffusion Halftoning

- Quantize each pixel in the raster order one-by-one, and spread the quantization error to the neighboring pixels.

Input image (I)




Halftone (Q)



$$\hat{I}(i, j) = I(i, j) + \sum_{m, n \in S} h(m, n) e(i - m, j - n)$$

$$Q(i, j) = u(\hat{I}(i, j) - \theta) \quad e(i, j) = \hat{I}(i, j) - Q(i, j)$$



u: unit step function

h: error filter

Proposed Method: Error Diffusion Halftoning


- The **quantization operation** invalid the adversarial variations.
- **Updating the values of the neighboring pixels repeatedly** makes the adaptive attacks hard to identify the mapping between the original image and the corresponding halftone.
- **Spreading quantization errors produces** better halftoning quality and tends to enhance edges and object boundary in an image.
- Take **both** adversarial robustness and clean data performance.
- Complementary to adversarial training.

Experimental Results

- Dataset: CIFAR-10
- Attacks (white-box): PGD [Madry et al.] and Mult [Lo and Patel]


Method	Training	Clean	PGD- ℓ_∞	PGD- ℓ_2	Mult- ℓ_∞	Mult- ℓ_2	Avg_{adv}	Avg_{all}
Vanilla	Standard training	94.03	0.01	0.20	0.05	0.01	0.07	18.86
Gaussian blur		<u>90.17</u>	0.20	1.34	0.17	0.05	0.44	18.39
Non-local means		88.66	0.02	0.49	0.03	0.00	0.14	17.84
JPEG compression		90.06	2.97	4.82	1.81	0.22	2.46	19.98
Bit-depth reduction		78.87	15.26	<u>10.84</u>	10.79	4.52	10.35	24.06
Halftoning (ours)		88.57	<u>9.53</u>	11.98	<u>5.54</u>	<u>1.07</u>	<u>7.03</u>	<u>23.34</u>
Vanilla	Adversarial training	<u>83.31</u>	<u>51.15</u>	<u>50.68</u>	54.10	40.29	<u>49.06</u>	<u>55.91</u>
Gaussian blur		<u>75.96</u>	<u>44.59</u>	<u>47.12</u>	45.07	32.48	<u>42.32</u>	<u>49.04</u>
Non-local means		75.47	44.67	45.29	16.59	14.53	30.27	39.31
JPEG compression		24.97	38.99	43.72	<u>59.15</u>	<u>44.72</u>	46.65	42.31
Bit-depth reduction		71.66	47.34	42.40	<u>48.50</u>	<u>41.63</u>	44.97	50.31
Halftoning (ours)		84.37	60.01	56.56	67.37	88.44	68.10	71.35

Feature Visualization



Feature Analysis

- Mean square differences between the features of clean images and the features of adversarial examples.



Conclusion

- Propose a new image transformation-based defense method using error diffusion halftoning.
- Remove adversarial perturbations and weaken adaptive attacks.
- Robust against white-box attacks.
- Produce high quality halftones and thus guarantee good clean data performance.