QTrojan: A Circuit Backdoor Against Quantum Neural Networks

Cheng Chu Lei Jiang Martin Swany Fan Chen

Dept. of Intelligent Systems Engineering, Indiana University Bloomington



Qubit vs Bit

Classical Bit: 0 1 Quantum Bit: 0 1

Quantum Bit (Qubit):

•
$$|\psi\rangle = \cos\frac{\theta}{2}|0\rangle + e^{i\varphi}\sin\frac{\theta}{2}|1\rangle$$

•
$$|\psi\rangle = \begin{bmatrix} \cos\frac{\theta}{2} \\ e^{i\varphi}\sin\frac{\theta}{2} \end{bmatrix}$$



Quantum Gates

- Quantum gate \Rightarrow Matrix
 - Single qubit gate $\Rightarrow 2^{*}2$
 - Two-qubit gate $\Rightarrow 4*4$
 - Multi-qubit gate \Rightarrow n*n





- Quantum gate operation
 - Matrix Multiplication

$$\begin{bmatrix} a & b \\ c & d \end{bmatrix} \times \begin{bmatrix} b_0 \\ b_1 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} b'_0 \\ b'_1 \end{bmatrix}$$



Variational Quantum Circuit



- Encoding layer S(x)
 - Prepare quantum state ρ_{χ} to represent the classical input data.
- Variational circuit block U(x)
 - Entangle and rotate ρ_x to generate the processed state $\tilde{\rho}_x$.
- Measuring layer
 - Measure $\tilde{\rho}_{\chi}$ to generate classical output.

Quantum Cloud Computing

Users

- Design a QNN circuit.
- Train the QNN circuit.
- Compile the trained circuit and input data into quantum analog pulses.
- Send the pulse sequence to a cloud NISQ server.

- Cloud NISQ server
 - Apply the pulse sequence to qubits.
 - Return the result to the user.



Quantum Compiler

Cloud NISQ server

- Different pulse durations.
- Maximum pulse amplitudes.
- Pulse channel numbers.
- Even the same server requires different values for pulse error calibration at different times.

Pulse

- An integer duration.
- A complex amplitude.
- The standard deviation



Backdoor Attacks in Classical NNs





Data-Poisoning-based Backdoor Attacks (DPBA)

Schemes	DPBA	QTrojan
No Trigger in Inputs	×	\checkmark
No Training Data	×	\checkmark
No Training Process	×	\checkmark
Works after Retraining	×	\checkmark

- QTrojan does not need to access the original dataset, use a long training process, or attach a trigger to input data.
- QTrojan can still work even after the user retrains the victim QNN with their new clean datasets.

Threat Model

- Download configuration file to minimize noises and errors before each compilation.
- Benign configuration file.
 - Normally operate
- Configuration file with a trigger.
 - Classify all inputs into a predefined target class



Angle Encoding.

- QTrojan does not need to access the original dataset, use a long training process, or attach a trigger to input data.
- QTrojan can still work even after the user retrains the victim QNN with their new clean datasets.

Backdoored Angle Encoding Layer

- Pre-encoding layer $\overline{S}(x)$
 - Move the qubit to a specific position, shielding the encoding layer.

S(x) RY 2.5



Angle encoding layer



- Normally applied encoding layer.
- Post-encoding layer $\tilde{S}(x)$
 - Rotate the qubit by θ predefined by the attacker.





Backdoored Angle encoding layer

Pulse-level Overhead



• Two data encoding layers have different pulse amplitudes, but QTrojan has the same duration as S(x).

Experimental Setup

Dataset & Circuit

Task	Pre-processing	Input Size	Qubit #	Circuit
MNIST-2 (0,1)	Down-sample	4*4	16	QNN
MNIST-4 (0-3)	Down-sample	4*4	16	QNN
Sin Function	N/A	N/A	4	QLSTM

- Software
 - Qiskit, Pytorch
- Hyperparameters
 - QNN. Learning rate = 1e-3, weight decay = 1e-4
 - QLSTM. Learning rate = 1e-2
- Metrics
 - Clean data accuracy (CDA)
 - Attack success rate (ASR)

DPBA vs QTrajon

Schemes	QNN (%)	DPBA		QTrajon	
	Accuracy	CDA	ASR	CDA	ASR
MNIST-2	98.25	91.56	99.5	98.25	100
MNIST-4	58.6	43	68.75	58.6	100

- The QNN simply cannot learn both the MNSIT classification task and the backdoored task well simultaneously.
- QTrajon can achieve 100% ASR in both tasks

Partial QTrojan against QNN

• We added \overline{S}_x (RX gates) on 1 ~ 4 qubits of the victim QNN.

Schemes	ASR of QTrajon (%)			
	1 qubit	2 qubits	3 qubits	4 qubits
MNIST-2	100	100	100	100
MNIST-4	61.18	72.92	81.4	100

 Only a pre-encoding layer on some qubits is powerful enough to abuse the victim 16-qubit QNN.

QTrojan against QLSTM.



• QTrojan forces the prediction result of QLSTM to a horizontal line.

Conclusion

- We propose a circuit-level backdoor attack, QTrojan, against quantum machine learning.
- QTrojan can be implemented by few quantum gates attached to victim QNN circuits.
- Compared to DPBA, QTrojan improves the CDA by21% and the ASR by 19.9% on average.