



A Robust Application Detector For Intelligent Wireless Collaboration

Kevin Pietsch and Sean Mason

Lockheed Martin Advanced Technology Laboratories (ATL)

Cherry Hill, New Jersey 08002

Presented by: Kevin Rigney of Lockheed Martin ATL


December 9, 2016

DISTRIBUTION A. Approved for public release: distribution unlimited. This research was developed partly under funding from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's (DARPA) MTO Office under contract HR0011-11-C-0033. The views, opinions, and/or findings expressed are those of the author(s) and should not be interpreted as representing the official views or policies of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

Spectrum Inference



- **What is it?**
 - **Generally: the ability to derive information over a wireless link inexplicitly (i.e. from evidence and reason)**
 - **Practically this means without demodulation**
- **Why is it important?**
 - **Spectrum usage continues to grow exponentially**
 - **Current spectrum sharing paradigm of sense-and-avoid leaves capacity on the table**
 - **Just because a primary user radio (PU) occupies a channel doesn't mean the channel should be off limits to secondary users (SU)**
 - **SU's must be able to share without hurting the PU**




In February 2016 The Cisco Visual Networking Index Forecast predicted a growth in global data usage from 4.4 exabytes/month in 2015 to over 30 in 2020

Research Considerations



- **Where does it lead?**
 - Radios that formulate strategies for coexistence without direct communication
 - Real-time feedback for spectrum sharing actions
- **Practical considerations**
 - How do you train?
 - What data is available for training?
 - What's the right amount of labeling?
 - How to build a radio around this inference ability?




An outline of the collaborative spectrum sharing process

Our Problem Statement




- **Determine the protocol application in use by a PU over the wireless channel**
 - **SU cannot demodulate and only has a simple detector**
- **Why bother? This allows spectrum sharing rules based on application**
 - **Most cognitive radio research assumes rules based on radio type**




The open system interconnect model

Profile Hidden Markov Model (PHMM)



- Extension of hidden Markov model (HMM), developed to find mutated genetic sequences
 - Genetic mutations (insertions and deletions) have close analogies to wireless traffic
- Models an application protocol as a sequence of hidden states (1)
 - Emissions (2) are protocol states after being encoded, modulated, and transmitted by the PU
 - Inserted (3) and deleted emissions are a consequence of shared, lossy medium






PHMM Training & Detection

Common to Training and Detection


- SU receives PU's emissions over wireless channel (4)
 - Possibly with deletions and insertions from other users
- Feature Extraction (5) reduces dimensionality of observed traffic
 - E.g. convert raw voltage measurement to burst durations and interarrival times
- State modeling (6) defines discrete states in feature space (e.g. clustering)
- Training (7) creates a state transition model per application type
- Detection (8) fits observed state sequence to a model







Experimental Setup

- **PU: IEEE 802.11g (WiFi)**
- **Test protocols**
 - Network association using dynamic host control protocol (DHCP)
 - Secure socket layer (SSL) handshake
 - Background
- **Feature extraction using Wireshark: packet size (bytes) and interarrival time (seconds)**



Experimental Results

- Results include
 - Discrimination of protocol from background (1)
 - Discrimination of protocols from each other (2)
- Number of training samples per model
 - DHCP (Net Join): 9
 - SSL: 23
 - Background (single state HMM): 20



Future/Ongoing Work



- **New detectors**
 - Esp. ones that require less training
- **More primary user radio types**
- **More challenging, realistic experimental setups**





Diagram of an experimental setup with a Long Term Evolution (LTE) primary user





Detector output from LTE experiment. A PHMM trained to detect SSL consistently produces a higher detection score on HTTPS collects (which contain SSL) than plain HTTP (which does not)



Thank You

Profile Hidden Markov Model (PHMM) Detector

- Extension of hidden Markov model (HMM), developed to find mutated genetic sequences
 - Genetic mutations (insertions and deletions) have close analogies to wireless traffic
- The HMM models an application protocol as a sequence of hidden states
 - Emissions are protocol states after being encoded, modulated, and transmitted by the PU
 - Inserted and deleted emissions are a consequence of shared, lossy medium



These are the features used to classify radio type. A non temporal classifier would need many degrees of freedom (and therefore many training examples) to separate background and match