Presentation attacks on biometric systems have long created significant security risks. The increase in the adoption of age verification systems, which ensure that only age-appropriate content is consumed online, raises the question of vulnerability of such systems to replay presentation attacks. In this paper, we analyze the vulnerability of face age verification to simple replay attacks and assess whether presentation attack detection (PAD) systems created for biometrics can be effective at detecting similar attacks on age verification. We used three types of attacks captured with iPhone 12, Galaxy S9, and Huawei Mate 30 phones from iPad Pro, which replayed the images from a commonly used UTKFace dataset of faces with true age labels. We evaluated four state of the art face age verification algorithms, including simple classification, distribution-based, regression via classification, and adaptive distribution approaches. We show that these algorithms are vulnerable to the attacks, since the accuracy of age verification on replayed images is only a couple of percentage points different compared to when the original images are used, which means an age verification system cannot distinguish attacks from bona fide images. Using two state of the art presentation attack detection systems, DeepPixBiS and CDCN, trained to detect similar attacks on biometrics, we demonstrate that they struggle to detect both: the types of attacks that are possible in age verification scenario and the type of bona fide images that are commonly used. These results highlight the need for the development of age verification specific attack detection systems for age verification to become practical.